HOPELESS IN STEPANAKERT: A RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP'S SABINE FREIZER
"Nagorno-Karabakh: Between Vote and Reality".
"On 10 December 2006, Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in which close to 75,000 people, or 83% of voters, approved the entity's first constitution. The document calls Nagorno-Karabakh a "sovereign democratic" state. The date of its approval is significant: the poll took place fifteen years to the day after the mountainous Caucasian enclave's Armenian population voted overwhelmingly for independence....
But neither the 1991 referendum nor that of 2006 is recognised as legitimate abroad. Nagorno-Karabakh may have been establishing state-like institutions since 1991, but it continues to be internationally considered as part of Azerbaijan, and no state - not even Armenia - has ever recognised its statehood....
Today, Nagorno-Karabakh's de facto authorities demand independence and international recognition, citing their right to national self-determination. Azerbaijan pledges that Nagorno-Karabakh's population will be provided with the highest form of self-government but within the country's frontiers. It claims the sanctity of international borders and its right to preserve its territorial integrity. It also blames Armenia for supporting Nagorno-Karabakh militarily and economically, in effect participating in the annexation of Azerbaijani land.
Since 1992, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been negotiating to find a solution. Talks have been facilitated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group, chaired by France, Russia and the United States. In 1997, 1998 and 2001 it seemed as though the sides were close to agreeing on a comprehensive settlement. However, each time, hopes were dashed....
Despite the difficulties, the building blocks of the potential settlement are well-known. The International Crisis Group spelled them out in two reports in 2005, and the mediators' summer statement confirmed the details: all sides would renounce the use of force; Armenian troops would withdraw from parts of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; displaced persons would be allowed to return; and both sides would commit to holding a referendum - whose results would be recognised by all - in Nagorno-Karabakh on final status, with the participation of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris. In the meantime, the entity would have an interim status, and the international community would provide substantial assistance, including peacekeepers - for this, the only "frozen conflict" in Europe without international monitors....
In a surprise turnaround after a brief meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents on the sidelines of the CIS summit in Minsk on 28 November, President Aliyev optimistically declared, "we are approaching the final stage" of the negotiations process. Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov added that only one matter remains a source of disagreement.
What could this be? In the past, negotiations have stalled over several issues, including the future of two land corridors linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (Lachin and Kelbajar), and the modalities of the future referendum and its conditioning on refugee return. After the Minsk meeting, Aliyev also stated "Azerbaijan's negotiating position remains unchanged." As Baku has refused to consider granting Nagorno-Karabakh any status outside Azerbaijan, the remaining sticking-point in the negotiations is likely to be the modalities of the referendum; and more specifically whether it would allow Nagorno-Karabakh to gain independence and international recognition or not....
Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to hold an internationally accepted referendum on its future status, with the participation of Karabakh Azeris and Armenians, is a key element in any resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such a deal would be comparable to what Serbia agreed to in signing the Belgrade agreement in 2002, which created the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". A clause was inserted into the Belgrade agreement stating that Montenegro could begin independence procedures in 2006, culminating in a referendum....
These post-Soviet referenda, like Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 December, are in no way comparable to Montenegro's. They did not meet the same conditions: most importantly, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova never gave their consent for them to occur. The Azerbaijani ministry of foreign affairs said that the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum "interferes with an ongoing peace process", and the vote could not be considered legitimate until the area's ethnic Azeris were able to return....
If Stepanakert wants to be gain legitimacy, it needs to show the international community not only that it can organise orderly and fair referendums, but also that it allows all those who should be eligible to vote to actually cast their ballots. In other words, they must begin to accept the return of the 40,000 Karabakh Azeris who were forced to flee in 1991-92". Sabine Freizer 14 December 2006, in www.crisisgroup.org
As in the past, our good friends of the noteworthy and no doubt humanitarianly inclined International Crisis Group, have put out a statement about one of the disputes afflicting the Kavkaz region: to wit the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabak. The conflict over the enclave, erupted back in the early Nineties of the last century, when in the breakup of Sovietskaya Vlast, the Armenian enclave fearing persecution by the overwhelming Muslim and nationalist regime in Baku, revolted and with the aid of their confreres in Armenia proper, threw-out the Azeri forces, as well as thousands of Azeris inhabitants of the enclave. Fighting which soon spilled over into Azeri territory proper, resulted in Armenian forces occupying considerable portions of Azeri territory, when a cease-fire was declared in 1994. Since then, negotiations between the two sides have been continuous, especially in the last six years, and, in those six years neither side has offered up the concessions necessary for a breakthrough. Id est, notwithstanding the fact that as far back as January of 2002 the American Special Envoy for resolving the talks stated that: "Current geopolitical conditions are well suited to for a deal", nothing of substance has occurred to make a settlement come any closer to reality (See Kenan Aliyev's article of 14 January 2002 in www.eurasianet.org). Indeed, it is merely a year ago, that the self-same Mlle. Frezier was optimistic that:
The recent talks in Minsk conducted at the Russian embassy, as part of the CSIS meeting, are part and parcel of this longstanding pattern. While the Azeri President Aliyev considered the talks had resulted in progress on a number of points, stating that the "we are approaching the final stage", his Armenia counterpart was much more muted. And, even President Aliyev admitted that neither side had in fact budged from their more important positions. In the case of Baku, that there is absolutely no question of Azerbaijan agreeing to any type of settlement which could result in Karabakh being granted independence. Whether or not such was endorsed by a popular referendum, of all 1992 residents of the enclave(on this see: Liz Fuller's article in 2 December 2006 article on the talks in www.eurasianet.org ). Indeed, Baku has in effect disowned the ballon d'essai, that it would be willing to accept the results of any such referendum, which it temporarily flew late in 2005 (see: 23 January 2006 report in www.eurasianet.org). And, in turn, Armenia refuses to endorse any settlement which the authorities in Stepanakert would object to. In short, there is about as much reason to be optimistic now, as one year ago, or indeed six or ten years ago. Indeed, the Baku based regional commentator Zardust Alizade, was I believe speaking realistically when he stated that the upshot of the talks, in the absence of an attempt at a miliatary solution would that the conflict "will stay frozen for ten years more" (see: www.regnum.ru).
As per the international implications of the conflict they are as follows: roughly speaking, Christian Armenia is allied with equally Christian Russian, and with Muslim Persia (!). While Azerbaijian is allied with Christian, but anti-Russian, Georgia and Muslim Turkey. The Western powers are as it were in the middle: the ideal situation for both the United States and the EU is for a resolution of the conflict which is acceptable to all sides. Principally because of the oil and gas exports which have now started to flow from Azerbajian to Western Europe. However, due to the large Armenia diaspora in both Western Europe and the United States, it is not possible for either to overtly support, oil and gas rich Baku. Particularly if, as it seems likely Baku were to attempt a coup de main and try to overthrow the status quo post bellum. Indeed from an Amerian perspective, that scenario would be the worst of all possible worlds: one of its two favorite clients in the Kavkaz region (Georgia being the other one), would be overtly violating international law by engaging in open aggression. And, precisely because of this open aggression the USA and the EU would be powerless to assist Baku.
While indeed, if the first shot were to be fired by Baku in an offensive against Armenia, the end result would be that both Russia and Persia (especially the former) would intervene on the side of Armenia. With sotto voce American encouragement for the purchasing of heavy military equipment, being possibly taken in Baku as encouragement to some type of future use of force, one can only hope that both the United States and the EU will strongly discourage any type of adventurism. Since indeed the end result of such an adventure is that Azerbajian will, due to the better elan vital of Armenia forces,and, the strength of its diaspora, again defeat the Azeris. With the only difference being that the oil and gas pipelines which are readily within reach of any future conflict zones, will no doubt be destroyed. And, no doubt a Azeri defeat would be followed by the overthrow of the currently, pro-Western, if corrupt Aliyev regime in Baku. Something that is in the interest of no one.
"On 10 December 2006, Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in which close to 75,000 people, or 83% of voters, approved the entity's first constitution. The document calls Nagorno-Karabakh a "sovereign democratic" state. The date of its approval is significant: the poll took place fifteen years to the day after the mountainous Caucasian enclave's Armenian population voted overwhelmingly for independence....
But neither the 1991 referendum nor that of 2006 is recognised as legitimate abroad. Nagorno-Karabakh may have been establishing state-like institutions since 1991, but it continues to be internationally considered as part of Azerbaijan, and no state - not even Armenia - has ever recognised its statehood....
Today, Nagorno-Karabakh's de facto authorities demand independence and international recognition, citing their right to national self-determination. Azerbaijan pledges that Nagorno-Karabakh's population will be provided with the highest form of self-government but within the country's frontiers. It claims the sanctity of international borders and its right to preserve its territorial integrity. It also blames Armenia for supporting Nagorno-Karabakh militarily and economically, in effect participating in the annexation of Azerbaijani land.
Since 1992, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been negotiating to find a solution. Talks have been facilitated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk group, chaired by France, Russia and the United States. In 1997, 1998 and 2001 it seemed as though the sides were close to agreeing on a comprehensive settlement. However, each time, hopes were dashed....
Despite the difficulties, the building blocks of the potential settlement are well-known. The International Crisis Group spelled them out in two reports in 2005, and the mediators' summer statement confirmed the details: all sides would renounce the use of force; Armenian troops would withdraw from parts of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; displaced persons would be allowed to return; and both sides would commit to holding a referendum - whose results would be recognised by all - in Nagorno-Karabakh on final status, with the participation of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris. In the meantime, the entity would have an interim status, and the international community would provide substantial assistance, including peacekeepers - for this, the only "frozen conflict" in Europe without international monitors....
In a surprise turnaround after a brief meeting between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents on the sidelines of the CIS summit in Minsk on 28 November, President Aliyev optimistically declared, "we are approaching the final stage" of the negotiations process. Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov added that only one matter remains a source of disagreement.
What could this be? In the past, negotiations have stalled over several issues, including the future of two land corridors linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (Lachin and Kelbajar), and the modalities of the future referendum and its conditioning on refugee return. After the Minsk meeting, Aliyev also stated "Azerbaijan's negotiating position remains unchanged." As Baku has refused to consider granting Nagorno-Karabakh any status outside Azerbaijan, the remaining sticking-point in the negotiations is likely to be the modalities of the referendum; and more specifically whether it would allow Nagorno-Karabakh to gain independence and international recognition or not....
Allowing Nagorno-Karabakh to hold an internationally accepted referendum on its future status, with the participation of Karabakh Azeris and Armenians, is a key element in any resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such a deal would be comparable to what Serbia agreed to in signing the Belgrade agreement in 2002, which created the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro". A clause was inserted into the Belgrade agreement stating that Montenegro could begin independence procedures in 2006, culminating in a referendum....
These post-Soviet referenda, like Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 December, are in no way comparable to Montenegro's. They did not meet the same conditions: most importantly, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova never gave their consent for them to occur. The Azerbaijani ministry of foreign affairs said that the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum "interferes with an ongoing peace process", and the vote could not be considered legitimate until the area's ethnic Azeris were able to return....
If Stepanakert wants to be gain legitimacy, it needs to show the international community not only that it can organise orderly and fair referendums, but also that it allows all those who should be eligible to vote to actually cast their ballots. In other words, they must begin to accept the return of the 40,000 Karabakh Azeris who were forced to flee in 1991-92". Sabine Freizer 14 December 2006, in www.crisisgroup.org
As in the past, our good friends of the noteworthy and no doubt humanitarianly inclined International Crisis Group, have put out a statement about one of the disputes afflicting the Kavkaz region: to wit the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabak. The conflict over the enclave, erupted back in the early Nineties of the last century, when in the breakup of Sovietskaya Vlast, the Armenian enclave fearing persecution by the overwhelming Muslim and nationalist regime in Baku, revolted and with the aid of their confreres in Armenia proper, threw-out the Azeri forces, as well as thousands of Azeris inhabitants of the enclave. Fighting which soon spilled over into Azeri territory proper, resulted in Armenian forces occupying considerable portions of Azeri territory, when a cease-fire was declared in 1994. Since then, negotiations between the two sides have been continuous, especially in the last six years, and, in those six years neither side has offered up the concessions necessary for a breakthrough. Id est, notwithstanding the fact that as far back as January of 2002 the American Special Envoy for resolving the talks stated that: "Current geopolitical conditions are well suited to for a deal", nothing of substance has occurred to make a settlement come any closer to reality (See Kenan Aliyev's article of 14 January 2002 in www.eurasianet.org). Indeed, it is merely a year ago, that the self-same Mlle. Frezier was optimistic that:
"Our understanding and our feeling is that there will be a progress in the talks, especially in 2006. And we are very hopeful that a settlement will possibly be found"
see above: www.eurasianet.org)
The recent talks in Minsk conducted at the Russian embassy, as part of the CSIS meeting, are part and parcel of this longstanding pattern. While the Azeri President Aliyev considered the talks had resulted in progress on a number of points, stating that the "we are approaching the final stage", his Armenia counterpart was much more muted. And, even President Aliyev admitted that neither side had in fact budged from their more important positions. In the case of Baku, that there is absolutely no question of Azerbaijan agreeing to any type of settlement which could result in Karabakh being granted independence. Whether or not such was endorsed by a popular referendum, of all 1992 residents of the enclave(on this see: Liz Fuller's article in 2 December 2006 article on the talks in www.eurasianet.org ). Indeed, Baku has in effect disowned the ballon d'essai, that it would be willing to accept the results of any such referendum, which it temporarily flew late in 2005 (see: 23 January 2006 report in www.eurasianet.org). And, in turn, Armenia refuses to endorse any settlement which the authorities in Stepanakert would object to. In short, there is about as much reason to be optimistic now, as one year ago, or indeed six or ten years ago. Indeed, the Baku based regional commentator Zardust Alizade, was I believe speaking realistically when he stated that the upshot of the talks, in the absence of an attempt at a miliatary solution would that the conflict "will stay frozen for ten years more" (see: www.regnum.ru).
As per the international implications of the conflict they are as follows: roughly speaking, Christian Armenia is allied with equally Christian Russian, and with Muslim Persia (!). While Azerbaijian is allied with Christian, but anti-Russian, Georgia and Muslim Turkey. The Western powers are as it were in the middle: the ideal situation for both the United States and the EU is for a resolution of the conflict which is acceptable to all sides. Principally because of the oil and gas exports which have now started to flow from Azerbajian to Western Europe. However, due to the large Armenia diaspora in both Western Europe and the United States, it is not possible for either to overtly support, oil and gas rich Baku. Particularly if, as it seems likely Baku were to attempt a coup de main and try to overthrow the status quo post bellum. Indeed from an Amerian perspective, that scenario would be the worst of all possible worlds: one of its two favorite clients in the Kavkaz region (Georgia being the other one), would be overtly violating international law by engaging in open aggression. And, precisely because of this open aggression the USA and the EU would be powerless to assist Baku.
While indeed, if the first shot were to be fired by Baku in an offensive against Armenia, the end result would be that both Russia and Persia (especially the former) would intervene on the side of Armenia. With sotto voce American encouragement for the purchasing of heavy military equipment, being possibly taken in Baku as encouragement to some type of future use of force, one can only hope that both the United States and the EU will strongly discourage any type of adventurism. Since indeed the end result of such an adventure is that Azerbajian will, due to the better elan vital of Armenia forces,and, the strength of its diaspora, again defeat the Azeris. With the only difference being that the oil and gas pipelines which are readily within reach of any future conflict zones, will no doubt be destroyed. And, no doubt a Azeri defeat would be followed by the overthrow of the currently, pro-Western, if corrupt Aliyev regime in Baku. Something that is in the interest of no one.
posted by Charles Giovanni Vanzan Coutinho, Ph.D @ 9:36 PM
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