PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK?

As another crisis in Pakistan plays itself out, we see patterns both old and new. As in prior crises: 1970-1971, 1977, 1988-1989, 1999, the key issue is what will the army do? And, not do? And, what about the other key domestic players in this recurring game of power-political musical chairs? And, what about the role of the United States? Should it withdraw its support from the weakening strongman, General Perez Musharraf? All these questions and more, are answered in the following commentary by the analyst, Ian Bremmer, of the Eurasia Group, which first appeared in the Beirut Daily Star (www.dailystar.com.lb). Without necessarily agreeing with the views that he holds, I do believe that they are worthy of being read and discussed. In particular, while Bremmer and I agree that the Musharraf regime has reached a political cul de sac, I disagree with Bremmer inasmuch as I view the situation as offering more possibilities for positive political development than he does. To my mind, nothing could be worse than another five to ten years of mindless, nay abysmal, military rule. With the increasing Talibanization of the entire country, being sotto voce-liked encouraged by the powerful and secretive, ISI (Internal Services Intelligence). An entity which masterminded both the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in the early to mid-1990's, and, the insurgency in the Kashmir against Indian rule during the same period. The latter almost leading to a full-fledged shooting war between the two countries in the late 1990's. With that being said, I hereby present to you, Ian Bremmer on the current crisis of the Musharraf regime in Pakistan.

The twilight nears for Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf, By Ian Bremmer Tuesday, September 11, 2007


"It is said that political power in Pakistan flows from three A's: Allah, the Army, and support from America. Of the three, it is the army leadership that has the clearest means of ridding the country of Pakistan's president in uniform, Pervez Musharraf. And that's the main reason any power-sharing deal with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is unlikely to end Pakistan's political turmoil.

Musharraf hoped to extend his presidency this fall without caving in to opposition demands that he renounce his military position and restore a civilian rival to the post of prime minister. But few international leaders face such a wide range of sworn domestic enemies.

Since seizing power following a 1999 coup, Musharraf has survived at least three serious assassination attempts. His anti-terrorist partnership with the United States fatally undermined his political alliance with Pakistan's religious conservatives even before his government stormed Islamabad's Red Mosque in July, killing more than 100 people. The threat of terrorist attacks inside the country will continue to rise.

Musharraf also has plenty of secular enemies. Their anger, inflamed in March when he tried unsuccessfully to sack the Supreme Court's independent-minded chief justice, rages on. The court recently ruled that the former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf unseated eight years ago, must be allowed to return from exile. This he did on Monday, before being resent into exile by the Pakistani authorities. Sharif's "decisive struggle against dictatorship"- and determined opposition to any deal with Bhutto that excludes him - will only intensify.

America isn't happy with Musharraf, either. Some in Washington charge that he has done too little to roust Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from safe havens along the country's border with Afghanistan. His recent flirtation with a plan to bypass Bhutto and declare emergency rule provoked pointed Bush administration criticism.

But it's the army that is most likely to eventually decide the fate of Musharraf's presidency. His rule has given the military leadership a strong role, but his eight years in office have badly damaged domestic support for the army's influence within the government. Musharraf's unpopularity has become its unpopularity.

Aware of a potential threat from within their ranks, Musharraf has populated his inner circle with relatively junior (and reliably loyal) officers. But a deal that makes Bhutto prime minister would undermine the military's influence - and eventually its support for Musharraf's presidency. As prime minister, Bhutto could eventually revisit her deal with Musharraf from a position of strength. Military leaders know this, and the threat that they will eventually push Musharraf aside will plague his presidency well into next year.

The army is unlikely to move on Musharraf directly unless subtler methods fail. The generals know that another coup would further weaken the military's popular standing - as well as Pakistan's relations with the United States - at a moment when Bhutto and Sharif have raised expectations at home and abroad for a permanent return to civilian rule.

But if Musharraf were to refuse to go quietly, the generals could promise him a long list of public corruption charges that he must survive without their protection. Musharraf's presidency won't survive long without military backing.

To preserve the appearance that their meddling is benign, senior military officers probably know that they cannot afford to install another general as president. Instead, they will most likely support cosmetic political reforms, including a new law that formally separates the roles of army commander and head of state. That is the strategy the military adopted in 1988, following the mysterious plane crash that killed former President (and General) Mohammad Zia ul-Haq. The army leadership ordered elections, permitted the formation of a civilian government, and then stage-managed the political process from the wings.

Bhutto, the leader of a secular party that now enjoys substantial support in Washington, would dominate policy planning in the next government at Musharraf's expense. She must build on her domestic support, but she can rely on economic and security cooperation with Washington to safeguard the country's stability.

In addition, the military's role as guarantor of stability, and its tight control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the army's crown jewels, will continue. The Bush administration can therefore enthusiastically back a return to civilian rule and claim a much-needed victory for democracy in a Muslim country.

But Bhutto would inherit Musharraf's domestic enemies. Sharif would fulminate against her every misstep, threats of attack from religious radicals would continue, and the military would safeguard its interests from just off stage. Adding to the pressure, America would expect the kind of cooperation in pacifying Pakistan's tribal areas that Musharraf has proven unable to provide.

The military will, under any scenario, continue to quell fears of complete political chaos. But it would also likely ensure that a Musharraf-Bhutto deal does not fully close a tumultuous chapter in Pakistan's history".


Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the global political risk consultancy, and author of "The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall." THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project Syndicate (c) (www.project-syndicate.org).