WHOM OVER WHO? WHO WON AND WHO LOST AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST

"QUESTION: Is there anything you might want to say about the decision of NATO member-states not to offer membership action plan for Georgia and Ukraine? Can you understand the decision as a Russian veto?

MR. CASEY: So certainly, no one should treat this as a rejection of Ukrainian or Georgian aspirations to join NATO. And we think it is a very positive statement on the part of the alliance that it does indicate that these two countries can and will be able to become members at an appropriate time. Certainly, there were differences and they’ve been well-discussed among NATO member-states as to whether now was the right moment to begin a membership action plan [MAP] with both those countries. But I do expect and it’s, again, indicated in the communiqué that between now and December, there will be an intensified series of discussions and dialogue between NATO and Georgia and Ukraine. And we certainly hope to see the kind of additional progress made that will respond to some of the concerns that allies expressed. And to get to your direct question, no, those concerns were not about Russia. Russia does not have veto over NATO options or NATO actions. And that’s clear, not only for Russia, but for any other country that is not a member-state".
State Department Spokesman, Thomas Casey, 3 April 2008, in www.state.gov

"Le sommet de l'Otan de Bucarest est celui des adieux aux alliés pour George W. Bush. Si le président américain veut bien dresser un bilan sincère de son action, il constatera qu'il laisse une Alliance atlantique affaiblie, militairement en difficulté en Afghanistan, politiquement divisée face à une Russie plus agressive, et toujours aussi hésitante sur ses missions, son rayon d'action et sa raison d'être au XXIe siècle.

Au-delà des communiqués glorifiant des compromis laborieux, le sommet, suivi, vendredi, par un dialogue sans précédent avec Vladimir Poutine, met en lumière l'absence de «leadership» américain dans le monde en cette fin d'un cycle marqué par la guerre en Irak et la crise transatlantique qu'elle a déclenchée. C'est un triste résultat pour une présidence placée d'emblée sous le signe de l'usage de la force au service d'une idéologie conquérante.

En ce qui concerne les relations avec la Russie, l'absence de direction est patente. La question de l'adhésion de l'Ukraine et de la Géorgie à l'Otan le montre. Malgré la campagne tardive menée par George W. Bush, les alliés ont étalé leurs divisions sur la place publique. Le problème de fond n'est pas de savoir si ces deux pays méritent ou non d'appartenir à l'Alliance atlantique. La réponse serait évidemment oui. Le problème est de définir une politique cohérente à l'égard de la Russie. Est-elle un partenaire, un adversaire ou un peu des deux ? Les alliés sont-ils capables d'avoir une position commune à l'égard de Moscou ? Ce n'est manifestement pas le cas. George W. Bush prêche dans le désert et ne rallie que les Polonais, Baltes et autres convaincus. Pour un débat de fond, il faudra attendre la relève à la Maison-Blanche.

Les Européens ne vont pas hypothéquer l'avenir. Angela Merkel est tout occupée à gérer sa coalition avec les sociaux-démocrates et cherche à passer le cap des élections de 2009. Nicolas Sarkozy a de la sympathie pour la Géorgie et pour l'Ukraine. Mais il a le regard fixé sur sa présidence de l'Union européenne et n'a aucun intérêt à susciter une nouvelle querelle avec la chancelière. Le moment viendra pour lui d'ouvrir le débat sur les vraies questions, touchant, par exemple, à la défense européenne et à la coopération nécessaire entre l'UE et l'Otan, ou encore à la politique énergétique à suivre en Europe".
Pierre Rousselin, 3rd of April 2008 "l'Adieu aux allies de George Bush", in www.lefigaro.fr

Obviously, the piteous wording of the American State Department spokesman: "Russia does not have a veto option over NATO options or NATO actions", has no basis in reality. Of course, the decision of the NATO allies, in not giving either Ukraine or Georgia MAP status, the stepping stones to NATO membership, was a result of Moskva's quite loud and persistent objections. Everyone, who was at Bucharest knows that quite well. We all have read the reports and the statements, official and unofficial of both Deutsch Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier, that neither Kiev or Tbilisi were ripe for being put on the path of NATO membership. The same statements, made more audibly also came from French Prime Minister Fillon in recent days (for German objections see: "Extraneous considerations block Georgian and Ukrainian maps at the NATO Summit," in www.jamestown.org & for French objections, see www.ft.com). Notwithstanding the recent American push to reward both powers MAP status, neither Berlin or Paris saw fit to completely alienate Moskva by agreeing with the USA on this objective. The only fig leaf that the USA did obtain from its allies in order to not make completely overt its diplomatic defeat on the issue was the promise that the alliance would look anew at the decision in December of this year. However this was little more than a polite facing saving for the Americans, with both German and French diplomats noting that: "it was inconceivable that MAP could be offered to both states this year" (see: "US seeks to console Ukraine and Georgia," in www.ft.com). Insofar as blocking MAP status from both countries was Moskva's primary goal at this summit, it can be said to have been a clear victory for Russian diplomacy. Albeit of a negative variety.

On the subject of missile defence, the Americans to a limited degree, managed to recoup their position somewhat by getting their NATO allies to agree unanimously that their proposed missile defence scheme for Poland the Czech Republic were in the interest of the alliance as a whole and even mouth words to the effect that an expansion of any such system was to be: "an integral part of any future NATO wide missile defence architecture" (For the official communique from the Summit, see:www.nato.int). With words of advice to Russia that it should: "take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals". Words which Moskva might or might not choose to take seriously. However notwithstanding this show of allied, even German support on a project that has occupied American diplomats for upwards of two years now, overall the NATO Summit cannot be by any means, be seen as a triumph of American diplomacy. Indeed, it would be accurate to say that 'on points', the Americans came out the losers vis`-a-vis Moskva. Whether one wishes or agrees to attribute that diplomatic defeat as Rousselin does to the "l'absence de 'leadership' Americain dan le monde", due to the Iraq debacle and a 'crise transatlantique,' is not entirely clear. One can argue the matter both ways, and, no doubt I and others will in the near future, attempt to do so. However let me finish this appraisal of the Summit by noting that in true opera bouffe fashion, the 'real' victor of the Summit was of course Athens, who was able, against the combined opposition of all it's partners to veto the proposed membership in the alliance of Macedonia, due of course to its name...Si non `e vero `e ben trovato.